Reply to Eleonore Stump by Hoffman, Joshua
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 4 
1-1-1985 
Reply to Eleonore Stump 
Joshua Hoffman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Hoffman, Joshua (1985) "Reply to Eleonore Stump," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol2/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
REPLY TO ELEONORE STUMP 
Joshua Hoffman 
Professor Stump raises many interesting and important issues in her comments 
on my paper, "On Petitionary Prayer." In what follows, I shall address some of 
these issues. 
My reason for rejecting Argument A was that it attacks NC (my necessary 
condition for the efficiency of petitionary prayer) in a misleading and confusing 
way, viz., by means of a conditional ('God would have brought about s even if 
one hadn't prayed for s') which in the context of the argument has an impossible 
antecedent, but which we ordinarily read as if it had a contingent antecedent. I 
did not mean to say that nothing in A poses a threat to NC; in fact, I said that 
Argument A "perhaps does appeal to some sound intuition that if it is necessarily 
true that God exists in the best of all possible worlds, then petitionary prayer is 
incoherent." I then formulated Argument B, which attacks NC directly through 
the assumption that God must create a unique optimal world. My strategy was 
then to reply to Argument B (and, a jortoriori, to Argument A) by challenging 
this assumption. Obviously, since Arguments A and B share this assumption, in 
conceding that it threatens NC when employed in B, I was conceding that it does 
so when employed in A. It was the confusing way that this assumption was used 
in A that I objected to, and not the claim that that assumption poses a threat to NC. 
Nevertheless, in the light of Stump's comments, I now think that my remarks 
about Argument A do not clearly reflect my intended strategy, and may have 
misled her into thinking that I was saying of A that nothing in it poses a threat 
to NC. If she was misled in this way, then I am to blame, and I am grateful to 
her for bringing this problem to my attention. 
In her discussion of Argument A, Stump remarks that "Hoffman himself has 
inadvertently been the source of much of the strength of his imaginary opponent's 
position, because Hoffman simultaneously analyzes all counter-factuals in terms 
of possible worlds and also allows his opponent assumption (a), which entails 
that there is only one possible world." I cannot agree that I allow my imaginary 
opponent (what Stump designates) assumption (a), since I spend a good deal of 
time refuting that very assumption. If my refutation is sound, then both Argument 
A and Argument B are disarmed, and the threat to condition NC is removed. 
Yet Stump ignores my refutation of assumption (a). Instead, she suggests that 
NC be reformulated in order to side-step the potential threat from assumption 
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(a). Her suggestion is that NC be replaced with NC': "If a prayer for a state of 
affairs, s, is efficacious, then if one hadn't prayed for s, God would not have 
brought about s." But there are at least two difficulties with NC' . First, a complete 
semantics for counter-factual conditionals is notoriously difficult to spell out-
which is why I resort instead to the terminology of possible worlds. Secondly, 
it is highly doubtful that NC' does, in fact, assert a necessary condition for the 
efficacy of petitionary prayer. On nearly all interpretations of counter-factual 
conditionals, one with an impossible antecedent is necessarily true. On assump-
tion (a), there is a unique best possible world which God necessarily creates. 
Therefore, on this assumption, together with the assumption that in the best 
possible world s is prayed for, the conditional which is the consequent of NC' 
is necessarily true because its antecedent is impossible. And since its consequent 
is necessarily true, NC' is necessarily true. Hence, NC' is consistent with assump-
tion (a). But, surely, the efficacy of petitionary prayer is not consistent with 
assumption (a). Thus, NC' does not state a necessary condition for the efficacy 
of petitionary prayer. Stump can object that she does not accept the interpretation 
of counter-factuals according to which those with impossible antecedents are 
necessarily true. But then she owes us an alternative account of the semantics 
of those counter-factuals and an explanation of why she rejects the standard 
reading of them. These she does not provide. In any case, I maintain that there 
is nothing wrong with NC. Stump thinks that there is something wrong with it 
because it is incompatible with assumption (a). But any correct necessary condi-
tion for the efficacy of petitionary prayer must be incompatible with assumption 
(a). It is assumption (a) which is mistaken. 
Stump thinks that there is an easy way to refute Argument A (and afortoriori, 
Argument B). She points out that assumption (a) is incompatible with "traditional 
Christian theology," and she infers from this that "as an argument designed to 
show an inconsistency in Christian belief, Argument A is not successful." This 
inference is invalid, for assumption (a) might be entailed by other elements of 
traditional Christian theology, e.g., by traditional views of God's power, good-
ness, and knowledge. Hence, an argument based on assumption (a) and designed 
to show an inconsistency in Christian beliefs could be successful even if traditional 
Christian theology explicitly or implicitly denies assumption (a), just so long as 
other elements of traditional Christian theology entail assumption (a). A defense 
of the possibility of efficacious petitionary prayer requires our showing that 
God's goodness, power, knowledge, and necessary existence do not, despite 
appearances, entail the necessity of a unique optimal world. 
Apparently, Stump thinks otherwise, for at one point she asserts that I am 
wrong to conclude that "the denial of this assumption [i.e., assumption (a)] is 
required to defend the efficacy of petitionary prayer." Since Stump had just 
argued that assumption (a) is incompatible with traditional theology, I am baffled 
40 Joshua Hoffman 
as to how she thinks assumption (a) can at the same time be compatible with 
the efficacy of petitionary prayer, when petitionary prayer is to be understood 
in the context of traditional theology. Moreover, assumption (a) implies the 
necessity of all events, something that seems to me to be obviously incompatible 
with the efficacy of petitionary prayer. If Stump denies the latter assertion, then 
she certainly owes us an argument in support of this denial. In fact, her only 
argument in support of her claim that assumption (a) is compatible with the 
efficacy of petitionary prayer is that assumption (a) does not entail that God 
would have brought about s [a prayed for state of affairs which in fact God 
brings about] even if no one had prayed for it. I have considered and challenged 
this argument above. 
I tum now to Stump's comments on my discussion of Argument C, a third 
challenge to the possibility of the truth of condition NC which I dealt with in 
my paper. Argument C assumes that God necessarily creates an optimal world, 
and that in the actual world God brings about a prayed for state of affairs, s. It 
infers from this that (1) God would have brought about s even if one hadn't 
prayed for s, where this has the implication that (la) God brings about s in every 
optimal world, i.e., in every possible world. My strategy is to attack this infer-
ence. Yet Stump thinks that I deny the implication from (1) to (la), and she 
cites a reason which I am supposed to have given for doing so. But what she 
cites is a reason given by me to deny that (1) can be inferred from the assumptions 
that God necessarily creates an optimal world and that in the actual world God 
brings about a prayed for state of affairs, s. It is not a reason given by me to 
deny the implication of (la) by (1), which implication is something I stipulate. 
Stump suggests that my Argument C could be recast in order to create a 
stronger argument posing a greater threat to the efficacy of petitionary prayer. 
She proposes dropping my condition NC in favor of a different necessary condi-
tion, borrowed, she reports, from William Alston. This is the condition that 
"God brings about a prayed for state of affairs s as a reply to the prayer for s," 
where 'as a reply to' means: that God is influenced to do s by a person T's 
prayer p, that God does s in light of T's prayer p, and that God does s in order 
to respond to T's prayer p. But as far as I can tell, this condition is not weaker, 
rather it is stronger, than NC. It seems to me, in other words, that if Stump's 
recast Argument C were a stronger argument against the efficacy of petitionary 
prayer than Argument C, then the necessary condition upon which the recast 
Argument C rested would be weaker than NC (assuming NC to be correct); at 
least, that condition would not entail NC. Yet it seems to me that Stump's 
necessary condition not only entails NC, it is not entailed by it. Therefore, it 
seems to me that Stump's recast Argument C is a weaker argument against the 
efficacy of petitionary prayer than my Argument C. 
Stump describes the recast Argument C as "like the argument against prayer, 
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which I presented in my paper on prayer." Let us call the argument in Stump's 
paper Argument D. Stump believes that this argument presents a challenge to 
petitionary prayer by relying upon the following reasoning: "Surely a perfectly 
good God could not be influenced to one or another course of action by the fact 
that some human being prays for it. To put it crudely, if the state of affairs 
prayed for is bad, a perfectly good God could not bring it about. And if the 
state of affairs prayed for is good, a perfectly good God will bring it about just 
because it is good, not because some creature has petitioned for it." It is not 
completely clear what this argument comes to, because it is not completely clear 
what Stump means by a "good" or a "bad" state of affairs. One plausible interpre-
tation of a "good" state of affairs is one which is such that when the ratio of its 
intrinsic goodness to evil and the ratio of the goodness to evil it causes are added 
together, on balance the goodness outweighs the evil. A "bad" state of affairs 
would be defined in a parallel fashion. Let us suppose that this is Stump's 
meaning. The problem raised by Argument D is this: how can the traditional 
God answer a prayer for something that is bad, or fail to bring about something 
good whether or not it is prayed for? And Stump's reply is that God sometimes 
answers prayers for bad things and sometimes fails to answer prayers for good 
things, because his doing so is necessary for a good which outweighs the evils 
permitted or the goods foregone. This good, she says, is divine/human friendship. 
As Stump said in her paper on prayer ("Petitionary Prayer"), (what I have called) 
Argument D is like the argument from evil: how can a perfectly good God permit 
evil or forego goodness? And Stump's solution of the problem parallels the free 
will defense by pointing to some hitherto unnoticed source of overbalancing 
goodness in the very process by means of which certain evils are permitted and 
certain goods foregone. The overbalancing goodness derives from divine/human 
friendship, and the process is the efficaciousness of prayer. 
I have no doubt that if Stump's claims that (i) God's permitting the efficacy 
of petitionary prayer is necessary for divine/human friendship, and (ii) divine/ 
human friendship is a source of goodness, were plausible and well-supported, 
then her attempt to solve the problem posed by Argument D would succeed. 
But there are two questions I want to raise about Stump's attempt to solve this 
problem. First, is her attempt successful in its own right? And secondly, is it 
the only possible solution to the problem? As to the first question, I argued in 
my paper that claim (i), at least, is not plausible or well-supported. Stump did 
not reply to my arguments to that effect, and I still think that these arguments 
raise serious doubts about Stump's solution. As to the second question, I believe 
the answer to it is also negative. My reply to Argument C showed that while a 
prayer for state of affairs s may be good, because the not obtaining of s may be 
equally good, God's failure to answer the prayer for s may not result in any net 
loss of goodness. In giving this reply, I did not assume that the efficacy of prayer 
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injected any additional element of value into the situation-I did not assume that 
its efficacy was "worth" anything. Yet my reply to Argument C is also an 
effective reply to Argument D. How can God not answer a prayer for something 
good? Because it may be that his not answering it results in a world that is 
equally good, the presence or absence of the thing prayed for being morally on 
a par. Hence, it seems to me that Stump is wrong when she says in her comments 
on my paper that I haven't taken up (and by implication, haven't met) "the 
strongest objection" being put by Argument D. I would maintain that my response 
to Argument C is a better reply to Stump's Argument D than is her own, since 
it isn't committed to what I think is the implausible contention that the efficacy 
of petitionary prayer is necessary for divine/human friendship. 
Obviously, Professor Stump and I remain in disagreement about some of the 
issues surrounding the problem of the compatibility of the efficacy of petitionary 
prayer and divine goodness. I would like to say, though, that hers is the ground-
breaking paper with respect to this problem which inspired my own modest 
efforts to solve the problem. 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
